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Introduction  
Long established military regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala collapsed in 1979 and 1982. 
These institutionalized military governments had failed to build broad legitimacy, and by the late 
1970s, they faced growing public unrest, insurgencies, and declining elite support. They fell to 
coups led by junior officers who sought to renovate the political systems. In both countries, these 
coups set in motion complex transitions that went through multiple phases. The earliest phases of 
these transitions were undemocratic, with unconstitutional military or joint military-civilian interim 
governments that had tenuous claims on legitimacy. Within a decade, both juntas had been 
forced to cede power to domestic caretaker regimes, in a process that fit well with the analytical 
framework laid out by Yossi Shain and Juan Linz’s work on interim regimes.[1] By the mid-1980s, 
both countries had elected constituent assemblies, and initiated controlled transitions to civilian 
governments elected under partially competitive conditions. These partially democratic 
governments faced ongoing insurgencies, serious challenges to their authority from the armed 
forces, and a general inability to effectively promote stability and the rule of law.  
While mostly domestic affairs, these two interim regimes shed light on many of the issues under 
consideration in this special issue, and have interesting parallels to their internationally organized 
and managed cousins. At certain junctures, the international community exerted influence to keep 
these domestic processes on track, or found itself powerless to aid a faltering regime because 
domestic regulations prevented outsiders from wielding greater influence. These dynamics, 
discussed in this case study, reveal the delicate relationship between domestic and international 
politics, and demonstrate that even the most “domestic” interim regimes are, in fact, intimately 
connected to and influenced by international politics.  
In the 1990s, United Nations-brokered peace talks provided a framework for a series of reforms in 
each country to open up political competition to the left, strengthen the rule of law, curb state 
abuses, and enhance the ability of the state to provide public goods. The interim governance 
period ended in 1994 in El Salvador and 1999 in Guatemala, with the first elections carried out 
under the new, more open political rules. While much work remained to be done in both countries, 
both were far more democratic—and more stable—han they had been at the beginning of the 
period. There were significant differences, however, between El Salvador and Guatemala in the 
performance of their partially democratic governments through the peace processes and 
implementation. In brief, the Salvadoran government showed far more capacity to carry out its 
commitments and serve as an effective implementer of the democratizing project.  
The paper will argue that partially democratic interim governments such as those in El Salvador 
and Guatemala have significant advantages over their illegitimate, unelected interim 
predecessors. The partially democratic governments generally demonstrated reasonable unity of 
purpose and coherence. They were not as heavily influenced by factional fights within the military. 
Many crucial constitutional issues were considered settled by all the parties. Such issues as the 
timing of elections were constitutionally mandated and thus not up for debate. Since 
constitutionally legitimate governments were in place, the scope for international intervention was 
necessarily limited to relatively soft and non-intrusive forms: there was no question of establishing 
an international trusteeship, with all of the accompanying political and practical liabilities.  
These partially democratic interim governments also suffered important limitations, however: the 
effectiveness of implementation of new state institutions depended on the capacity and efficacy of 
the incumbent caretaker government.[2] There was little international actors could do if—as in 
Guatemala—the constitutionally legitimate local government made a hash of implementation. 
Prospects for long-lasting stability and good governance are dim where interim governments are 
weak, yet where a partially democratic, constitutional government is already in place, international 
actors lack a legitimate means of scaling up their involvement to compensate for the interim 
government’s weaknesses.  
This paper will look briefly at the early, undemocratic interim governments. It will then turn to the 
partially democratic interim governments that negotiated and implemented the peace accords, 
examining the impact of political institutions developed during the interim period, the strength and 
coherence of government and opposition political parties, the design of the peace processes 
themselves, and the role of international actors on the quality of governance and stability 
achieved. I will argue that these variables, in combination, account for the difference in 
performance between the Salvadoran and Guatemalan interim governments.  
The Initial Phase: Military-Based Interim Governments  
In 1979 in El Salvador, reformist military officers formed a “Revolutionary Governing Junta” in 
partnership with a coalition of social democratic parties and reformist elements of the Catholic 
Church. Two months later, when the social democrats withdrew from government in protest over 
human rights violations, the army formed a new alliance with the Christian Democrats. This new 
junta ruled, with occasional internal reshuffling, until an interim government and constituent 
assembly were elected in 1982. A civilian president was elected in 1984 under the new 
constitution, with legislative elections following shortly after.  
In Guatemala, there was less effort to incorporate civilian supporters: two consecutive de facto 
military governments ruled without significant civilian party support. The second of these allowed 
constituent assembly elections in 1984, and an elected civilian government took office in 1986. 
Transitions to limited, elected civilian rule based on legitimate constitutions were complete by the 
mid-1980s in both countries.  
Neither of the initial, non-democratic interim governments was very effective, a factor driving 
these governments to hold elections fairly quickly and step aside. The reasons for their failures 
differed somewhat, however. In El Salvador, the Revolutionary Governing Juntas (JRGs) were 
deeply divided internally, between factions that favored deep reforms and democratization, and 
factions that favored a violently repressive strategy. I have argued elsewhere that the depth of 
internal divisions actually increased the severity of violence used by hard line factions against the 
general public, as hardliners sought to veto political compromise with the left. This intensified 
state violence further radicalized the left, pushing thousands of members of non-violent popular 
organizations to join the nascent guerrilla forces. Killings were directed particularly against 
moderate members of the left who were actively seeking compromise solutions to the political 
crisis; by the end of 1980, most of the surviving moderates had fled the country, along with 
military officers whose reformist project had unraveled.[3]  
Although the army/Christian Democratic JRG succeeded in implementing a limited land reform, 
this did not diminish the slide toward civil war, which began in earnest in January 1981. The 
newly inaugurated Reagan administration in Washington simultaneously strengthened U.S. 
military assistance, and began pressing for democratization. The administration viewed greater 
political legitimacy as a sine qua non for effective counterinsurgency; it also considered it 
essential for retaining the political support of the U.S. Congress for increased military 
assistance.[4] A second source of pressure for democratization was internal: conservative 
activists associated with the business community were alarmed by land expropriations carried out 
by the military/Christian Democratic junta, and sought opportunities to compete directly in 
elections in hopes of establishing a government more protective of private property.[5] The 
military ultimately agreed to this, and elections for an interim government and constituent 
assembly were held in 1982.  
In Guatemala, the 1982 coup brought to power General Efraín Ríos Montt. Junior officers called 
Ríos out of retirement and invited him to take power in an effort to counteract what they saw as 
the extensive corruption and incompetence of much of the high command. This reflected the 
primary line of internal division in the military between the established, “institutionalist” leadership, 
and various wildcat groups—particularly junior officers who were actively involved in combat 
operations against the rebels. However corrupt the mainline officers were, Ríos Montt brought his 
own complications, including weekly broadcast sermons from the presidential house that blended 
Protestant evangelism and counter-terror in a way that did not enhance the government’s 
legitimacy in majority-Catholic Guatemala. He also earned very little international acceptance. 
Despite the comparative success of Ríos’ aggressive counterinsurgency strategies, 
establishment officers overthrew him after less than two years and then orchestrated a highly 
controlled transition to elected civilian rule. A significant push for a transition to civilian rule came 
from within the military: a growing current of senior officers viewed indefinite military government 
as damaging to the military institution, and likely to result in ongoing civil conflict. These same 
officers also expected to be able to control the transition, and any civilian government that 
resulted.[6]  
Thus the de-facto governments that followed the collapse of established regimes in both El 
Salvador and Guatemala failed to achieve sustained legitimacy, capacity to govern, or stability. In 
line with the predictions of Shain and Linz, internal conflicts within these regimes contributed to 
instability, and their lack of constitutional standing undercut their claims for popular support. The 
Salvadoran junta’s policies actually accelerated the growth of insurgency, while Guatemalan de 
facto governments turned the tide against the insurgents through mass murder in the countryside. 
Neither government had any prospects for achieving lasting order and legitimacy, and so both 
created civilian governments to take over governance by the mid-1980s. It thus fell to successor 
civilian governments, elected from among parties from the political center and right, to continue 
the counterinsurgency efforts and eventually negotiate peace agreements that ended the civil 
conflicts through further democratization.  
Partially Democratic Interim Governments  
The partial democracies established in the mid-1980s bore the responsibility of finding a durable 
political framework capable of definitively ending the civil conflicts. These included the 
presidential administrations of José Napoleón Duarte in El Salvador, and Vinicio Cerezo in 
Guatemala, both relatively conservative Christian Democrats who had reached a political 
accommodation with the armed forces. Unlike their de facto predecessors, each could claim 
some measure of electoral mandate. Both governments were elected under the terms of liberal, 
individual-rights based constitutions.  
Neither government succeeded in negotiating an end to the conflict. Duarte began negotiations 
with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), with little success. It fell to his 
successor, Alfredo Cristiani of the conservative National Republican Alliance (ARENA), to enter 
into United Nations-mediated talks, leading to final peace accords in early 1992. In Guatemala, 
Vinicio Cerezo was frequently threatened with military coups in the final stages of his presidency, 
and therefore was unable to take the risks associated with serious negotiations with his 
opponents. His successor, Jorge Serrano, began talks mediated by the Catholic Archbishop of 
Guatemala. Serrano’s presidency collapsed after he sought to close down Congress and the 
Constitutional Court and rule by decree.  
This incident ended up reinforcing Guatemalan liberal constitutional norms, as all sectors of 
society—including eventually the dominant leadership group in the military—rallied in support of 
constitutionality and forced Serrano to relinquish power. He was replaced by an interim 
administration led by former Human Rights Procurator Ramiro De León Carpio, who further 
advanced talks with the rebels. Finally, in 1995, Alvaro Arzú, representing the more modernized 
sectors of the business community, was elected president. Arzú brought the peace talks to 
fruition, with mediation from the UN, and bore the responsibility of implementing the agreements.  
The period of partially democratic governance had numerous effects on the political system. As 
noted in the introductory paper to this special issue, sometimes the procedures of democracy 
yield positive long-term benefits, even if the short -term outcomes are not necessarily fully 
democratic. In Guatemala and El Salvador, these interim administrations built increased support 
for liberal democratic norms, even with the archconservative business communities that initially 
supported authoritarian solutions. During this period, habits of negotiation and compromise took 
root, and parties of the right, as well as nascent parties of the left, gained a degree of confidence 
in their own political viability in a competitive system.  
Once United Nations -mediated negotiations got under way in each country, the governments and 
rebels quickly converged upon liberal norms as the basis for any peace settlement. Negotiations 
culminated in the 1990s with definitive peace agreements that ended the civil wars on the basis of 
reforms to open democratic competition to parties of the left, strengthen the rule of law, reduce 
repression, ensure civilian authority over militaries, and strengthen the capacity of the state to 
provide public goods. The following sections examine how the following factors shaped the 
outcome of partially democratic interim governance in El Salvador and Guatemala: inherited 
political institutions, civil-military relations, public safety challenges, ad-hoc representational 
schemes during peace implementation, the role of international actors, and political party 
formation.  
Institutional Effects  
The legacy of military domination weighed heavily on the elected civilian governments that took 
power in the mid-1980s. A history of militarism and political exclusion helped give rise to the 
insurgencies in the first place, and in the context of civil war, the militaries in both countries 
expanded their resource bases and engaged in wholesale slaughter of suspected opponents, 
mainly non-combatant civilians. Government forces killed around 75,000 civilians in El Salvador, 
and around 200,000 in Guatemala. State violence in Guatemala was directed particularly against 
the indigenous population, in what the UN-sponsored Commission for Historical Clarification 
characterized as genocide.[7] Military forces enjoyed impunity for such violence, and civilian 
authorities had virtually no control over the military, particularly with respect to the activities of 
intelligence organizations. Military power extended to the local level in both countries through 
various paramilitary structures, but military social control was far more extensive in Guatemala.  
Despite all this, the transition to partial democracy had important consequences. With 
constitutionally mandated, regularly scheduled elections, the timing of elections was not a matter 
of contention. The first post-accord elections in El Salvador occurred two years after the signing 
of the accords, and a full year after completion of military demobilization. This allowed sufficient 
time for the rebels to form a functional political party, and resulted in elections with a high degree 
of domestic credibility.[8] Post-war elections in Guatemala occurred almost 3 years after the final 
accords were signed, and more than 2 and a half years after final demobilization of rebel forces. 
This, too, was a sufficient interval to provide the left time to organize itself politically. Though 
ultimately the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) won only a modest share of the 
vote, the results were generally accepted as correct and credible.  
In El Salvador, the semi-autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) proved to be a weak 
institutional link. By law, it consisted of representatives of the parties already represented in the 
Legislative Assembly. This would be a reasonable arrangement, except that the left, which 
constituted nearly half the electorate, had been violently excluded from the political system. The 
United Nations estimated that as of August 1993, some 768,000 voters (27 percent of eligible 
voters) lacked the required electoral documentation and were not on the voter roles.[9] The 
incumbent parties in the legislature had little incentive to address this problem, since they 
anticipated that newly registered voters were likely to be disproportionately supporters of the 
FMLN. Not surprisingly, the TSE dragged its feet, and the parties used salaried positions in the 
TSE as ways to fund partisan activities rather than the work of the Tribunal.  
It is here that the dynamic relationship between domestic and international processes in interim 
governance becomes important, even in these cases of interim administrations that seem to 
completely conform to the domestically-driven models created by Shain and Linz. In El Salvador, 
these problems with voter registration created a situation where the domestically-created 
electoral tribunal, biased by the powers that had created it, ran the risk of jeopardizing popular 
acceptance of the electoral process. Therefore, the UN observer mission (United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador, or ONUSAL) began to do more than just monitor the situation; it 
intervened and assumed an active role in voter registration. In order to ensure that the left was 
not kept out of the electoral process, ONUSAL ensured that the TSE updated the voters’ rolls. 
ONUSAL members picked up TSE employees at their homes, delivered them to their offices, 
provided generators and photocopy machines, and closely supervised their work. Some 200 UN 
civilian police were temporarily assigned to support this effort. While this approach generated 
some nationalist complaints from the government and TSE, it did result in much of the work 
getting done and a more than 50 percent reduction in the number of unregistered eligible voters.  
Entrenched constitutional reform procedures in both countries also affected outcomes. In El 
Salvador, the 1983 constitution required any amendment to be approved by a majority of one 
legislative assembly, followed by a “qualified majority” (2/3) of the next legislative assembly.[10] 
This requirement, in combination with the electoral calendar, created a deadline for the 
government to accept proposed constitutional reforms during the negotiating process in 1991. 
Had the sitting Assembly in April 1991 not approved the negotiated constitutional reforms, 
implementation of terms negotiated in the peace process would have been delayed an additional 
three years. Faced with this constitutionally-imposed deadline, the government of Alfredo Cristiani 
of ARENA requested and obtained legislative approval of constitutional reforms that substantially 
reduced the political power of the armed forces, clarified and expanded elected civilian authority, 
and paved the way for important reforms to the judiciary. This accomplishment greatly increased 
the confidence of the FMLN rebels regarding Cristiani’s intensions. It also demonstrated 
ARENA’s political capacity to deliver on concessions made at the bargaining table.  
In Guatemala, constitutional reform procedures were less auspicious. The constitution of 1985 
required a popular referendum, in addition to legislative approval. Rather than allowing an up or 
down vote on the whole package of 50 constitutional reforms, a court ruling required the 
government to group the reforms into four ballot questions. To the chagrin of Guatemalans who 
supported the reforms, as well as international obs ervers, all four ballot questions were defeated 
by margins of roughly two to one, reflecting a particularly strong “no” vote in the capital city.[11] 
Turnout was only about 18 percent (21 percent in the capital), despite months of publicity and 
get-out-the-vote work, much of it funded by international donors. The defeat was attributable to at 
least two main factors:  
· a powerful, expensive anti-reform publicity campaign during the final few weeks before 
the vote, which portrayed the reforms in a negative, almost apocalyptic light; and  
· public ignorance regarding the content of the reforms, which were so complex as to be 
easily misunderstood. The defeat of the reforms in May 1999 halted implementation of 
much of the institutional transformation agreed to by the government and the rebels.  
The separation of powers provided for in El Salvador’s constitution created difficulties for interim 
governance because it enabled the judiciary to reject out of hand any reforms that required the 
judicial or administrative cooperation of the court system. For example, when the UN Truth 
Commission for El Salvador called in 1993 for the removal of the head of the Supreme Court for 
his involvement in shielding human rights abusers, he responded that “only God” could remove 
him. Only after the post-1994 Legislative Assembly selected new members for the Supreme 
Court, following the new procedures, did the courts begin to cooperate in measures to improve 
human rights compliance and judicial performance.  
Civil-Military Relations  
Since both peace accords required substantial changes to the organization, authority, and 
oversight of the military, the ability of the post-agreement governments to implement such 
changes was crucial to the credibility of the peace processes. In El Salvador, the military 
generally complied with the requirements of the accord regarding demobilization, though not 
completely of their own volition. While the military complied with the interim government in most 
aspects of demobilization and reform, when it came to leadership changes, the government had 
difficulty obtaining compliance. A provision of the Salvadoran accord was that an “Ad-Hoc 
Commission” would assess the records of military officers and identify which ones were 
unsuitable for military leadership in a democracy. Contrary to expectations, the Ad-Hoc 
Commission recommended removal of 102 officers, including the entire high command. Several 
top officers, including the minister and deputy minister of defense, refused to go.  
As with the revision of the voters’ roll, the situation moved forward only in response to 
international pressure. Only after the UN Truth Commission for El Salvador named these and 
other top leaders as intellectual authors of a number of notorious human rights crimes, and the 
US made $11 million in aid conditional on their departure, did the officers agree to retire.[12] 
Another misstep by the Cristiani government was its decision not to demobilize the existing 
Treasury Police and National Guard security forces. The language in the accord required their 
demobilization “as public security forces.” The government decided this left the door open to 
retaining these forces in other capacities, and renamed them Military Police and Border Guards, 
respectively. This was clearly at odds with the spirit of the accords, and generated a brief but 
intense crisis that was resolved by UN mediation and the government’s agreement to demobilize 
those forces.  
In Guatemala, the accords were less demanding of the military, and the Guatemalan military got 
ahead on most issues by demobilizing its extensive paramilitary network before it was required, 
and carrying out an autonomous purge of the officer corps. This reflected the military’s 
comparatively robust political standing with the country’s civilian elites. Having effectively 
defeated the guerrillas, the Guatemalan forces were not prepared to allow the degree of civilian 
supremacy achieved in El Salvador. Despite strong popular demand for accountability for the 
extreme human rights abuses committed during the conflict, Guatemalan officers were hard-set 
against any accountability mechanism analogous to the Salvadoran “ad hoc commission” process. 
For reasons that I explain further below, the civilian governments that implemented the peace 
process lacked the political strength and coherence to challenge the military on this point, even 
after the UN-sponsored Historical Clarification (truth) Commission for Guatemala declared that 
the military had committed genocide.[13]  
The most substantively and symbolically important military issue in Guatemala was the 
demobilization of a military intelligence organization called the Presidential General Staff (Estado 
Mayor Presidencial—EMP) that ostensibly served the presidency but in practice served as a 
mechanism by which the military controlled civilian presidents. The EMP was notorious for death 
squad operations as well. The government of Alvaro Arzú proved unable or unwilling to shut 
down the EMP, and this was belatedly accomplished, under significant civil society pressure, by 
his successor Alfonso Portillo.  
Public Security and Illegal Armed Groups  
A central challenge for both interim governments was provision of public security. On one hand, 
both El Salvador and Guatemala committed to creating new civilian-controlled police forces. 
These were crucial to reassuring ex-rebels—particularly those in El Salvador—that they would 
not be persecuted in the future. The doctrine and composition of the new National Civilian Police 
(PNC) in El Salvador were explicitly designed to ensure the organization’s apolitical nature.[14] 
On the other hand, crime waves are typical in post-civil war settings, and both governments were 
under public pressure to protect the public during the transition to the new force.  
The governments followed contrasting strategies: one built a new police force from scratch, while 
the other folded elements of the old security regime into a “new” organization. Both paths had 
their pros and cons, though for the prospects of democratization and stability, creating the police 
force anew seems to create better prospects for building a police force that respects basic human 
rights. The trick is for the regime to outlast the worsened security situation while the police force 
is learning how to operate.  
The Salvadoran regime initially dragged its feet, but ultimately built a completely new police force 
that eventually performed relatively well and generally upheld human rights. Transitional security 
was grossly inadequate, however, and a significant crime wave resulted that was not stemmed 
until 1996. Rampant crime undermined initial public confidence in the PNC and tarnished public 
views of the peace process in general.[15] During the early deployment of the PNC, ONUSAL 
CIVPOL officers sometimes crossed the line from observers to active law enforcement agents, 
though they lacked legal standing to play such a role. This was a poor substitute for a systematic 
and adequate transitional security plan.  
In contrast, the Arzú government in Guatemala followed an expedient path of folding virtually the 
entire existing police force into the new PNC, and placing the expanded force under the exclusive 
command of former officers from the old police force. Careless recruitment, selection, and training, 
combined with weak management and oversight mechanisms, resulted in a police force that was 
large, but neither effective nor respectful of human rights. The UN verification mission, MINUGUA, 
had only a small number of advisors involved in the police development project, and had 
relatively little capacity to influence government policy on this issue. Arzú’s expedient approach 
deferred the creation of a post-war security vacuum until much later in the decade, with a major 
crime wave peaking in 2003. Given the many defects of the “new” PNC, long-term prospects for 
effective and democratic policing are dim.[16] In sum, neither government handled its police 
reform and public security duties very well, though in the long run the Salvadoran approach 
appears to have been better, despite the medium term security problems.[17]  
The issue of public security extended far beyond that of establishing civilian control over the 
military and building a credible and capable police force. The end of the wars had left behind 
various networks of military intelligence, former military, private death squads, and former rebel 
clandestine groups that devoted themselves principally to pecuniary criminal activities such as 
smuggling, extortion, narcotics trafficking, car theft, illegal logging, and kidnapping for ransom.  
These same networks also seemed to involve themselves in politically motivated murders and 
threats, and were thus capable of derailing the fragile peace processes in both countries. In 
Guatemala, illegal armed groups directed violence and threats particularly against civil-society 
organizations promoting accountability for past human rights crimes. A surge of suspicious 
killings in 1993 in El Salvador seemed to threaten the peaceful climate needed for the 1994 
elections. The government agreed to formation of a “Joint Group for the Investigation of Illegal 
Armed Groups with Political Motivation” comprising Salvadoran and international police 
investigators, under the administrative auspices of the UN Development Program (UNDP). 
Though it produced little real accountability, the Joint Group’s investigative efforts suppressed 
violent activities during the electoral season, resulting in an overall decline in violence during the 
campaign. The even more severe problems in Guatemala eluded solution. The first post-
transition government (Alfonso Portillo) agreed to the formation of a similar joint investigative 
commission, but various legal obstacles prevented implementation. Coercive criminal networks 
referred to as “hidden powers” or “parallel powers” continue to be very influential and 
fundamentally undercut the legitimacy of the Guatemalan state.[18] 
Ad-Hoc Representational Schemes  
The Salvadoran peace accords created a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace 
(COPAZ) that consisted of two members each from the government and the FMLN, as well as 
one from each of the political parties in the National Assembly. COPAZ was to oversee the 
implementation of the peace process (implying dispute resolution authority), draft legislation for 
review by the Assembly, and nominate individuals for key posts such as the director of the PNC. 
COPAZ did not have executive powers, which remained with the government (and the FMLN for 
those issues where it had independent capacity to act, such as demobilization or provision of 
information). Unfortunately, the composition of COPAZ resulted in deadlock and ineffectiveness. 
Equal numbers of parties from the legislature voted in support of ARENA and the FMLN, resulting 
in stalemate on crucial issues. This diminished COPAZ’s role and increased the importance of the 
UN’s verification and mediation role.[19]  
In retrospect, it might have been a good idea for COPAZ, or something like it, to have a voice in 
reconstruction efforts. The government formed a National Reconstruction Secretariat, and 
developed a comprehensive reconstruction plan that attracted nearly $1 billion in foreign 
commitments. In practice, these monies were often spent in partisan ways rather than responding 
to greatest needs or greatest potential returns on investment. The opposition had no direct say in 
how funds were spent, so that international donors ultimately became the mechanism for 
representing the interests of the FMLN.[20]  
In Guatemala, an Accompaniment Commission was established with functions vaguely similar to 
COPAZ. It was composed of two representatives each from the government and the URNG, four 
notable citizens, a single representative of Congress, and the chief of the United Nations 
Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA - with voice, but without vote). Its role was to 
analyze the difficulties and obstacles encountered in the application of the timetable, review legal 
proposals before they went to Congress, establish calendars for implementing various 
commitments under the accords, raise funds, and report concerns to MINUGUA. Though 
sometimes useful, the committee’s effectiveness was limited by lack of staff, and by the very 
limited claims of the four “notable citizens” to represent anyone other than themselves.[21]  
Perhaps more central to peace implementation in Guatemala were dozens of civil society 
commissions charged with fleshing out the sometimes very vague commitments of the peace 
accords on such issues as educational reforms, judicial reform, official multilingualism, and 
multiculturalism. These commissions resulted in intense public debate and broadened 
participation in discussions on public policy issues. Some of them produced valuable 
recommendations for concrete reforms, as well as difficult compromises on questions such as 
what indigenous languages the government should prioritize when making services available in 
multiple languages. Ultimately, the commissions lacked legislative and executive authority, and 
few of their recommendations have been implemented. This raises the question of whether the 
effort that various civil society groups—particularly from the Mayan community—put into these 
commissions ultimately benefited democratic development or simply produced greater frustration 
and cynicism. The sheer number of different commissions, and the delegation of so many 
agenda-setting tasks to them, tended to dilute and distract from the government’s responsibility to 
comply with its commitments under the accords.[22]  
The International Role  
Neither case involved the kind and extent of international intervention that would pose a risk of 
undermining the legitimacy of national governments. United Nations verification missions were 
the international keystones in both peace processes. These missions, ONUSAL in El Salvador 
and MINUGUA in Guatemala, were of course subject to occasional criticism. Rightwing 
commentators in El Salvador characterized the UN mission as the “white plague” (in reference to 
the white UN vehicles), and indiscretions by UN staff received a great deal of publicity. As the UN 
prepared to leave El Salvador, a local newspaper ran a cartoon of a mother in an apron 
(representing ONUSAL) keeping two squabbling kids (ARENA and FMLN) from fighting. Attitudes 
toward the UN in Guatemala were somewhat more menacing, and had a sharper and more 
nationalistic tone. Nonetheless, neither mission entered into open political confl ict with local 
parties.  
Of the two, ONUSAL played a more assertive role, and assumed more direct duties with respect 
to voter registration and public security (hence moving itself beyond the strict “observer” mandate, 
as observers traditionally record events, and do not actively intervene to affect processes). 
Overall, ONUSAL was highly effective in its mix of ongoing mediation, authoritative interpretation 
of the accords, verification and forceful criticism of the parties for non-compliance, and coaching 
and field training of new governmental institutions. While not interventionist in comparison with 
missions in more troubled cases such as Cambodia, ONUSAL was active, politically high profile, 
and sufficiently strong to generally defend the interests of the ex-rebels during the transition. 
ONUSAL was strongly supported by senior, New York based senior UN officials who periodically 
visited El Salvador and brought to bear the political influence of the Security Council. In cases 
where the FMLN had agreed to tolerate government violations of the accords in exchange for 
concessions it was interested in, the UN took principled positions insisting on compliance with the 
letter of the accords. That it generally succeeded is indicative of the political clout of the UN 
mission.  
In contrast, MINUGUA was hampered by a more prolonged pre-peace deployment as a human 
rights-only mission; by its status as a General Assembly mission lacking Security Council 
involvement; by the very vague, unverifiable requirements of the peace accords; and by the 
weakness of the Guatemalan parties, who showed very limited capacity to implement what was 
promised. MINUGUA may also have been hampered by the fact that the chief of mission had 
earlier been the lead mediator/negotiator on behalf of the UN. It proved difficult to shift from the 
confidence-building role of mediator to the more confrontational role of verifier. In the wake of 
difficult cases such as Somalia and Bosnia, the UN was under considerable political pressure to 
have a success in Guatemala, which provided disincentives for political confrontations with the 
government. In interviews, MINUGUA staff expressed frustration with the mission’s very 
diplomatic positions on obvious and grave violations of the accords by the government.  
MINUGUA introduced some effective innovations. It operated on a shoestring and drew heavily 
on UN Volunteers for lower level staffing, an experiment that was generally successful. It began 
early on to focus on institution building, in contrast to ONUSAL where capacity building began too 
late and some displacement of local institutions took place. Unfortunately, MINUGUA’s institution-
building strategy met with limited success, because of the combined weakness and lack of 
commitment by the government in key areas such as police, judicial, military, and intelligence 
reform.[23]  
MINUGUA benefited from a high degree of consensus between the mission and the international 
financial institutions regarding the need to increase taxation and government expenditures. 
Whereas in El Salvador, the peace mission and the international financial institutions (IFIs) had 
clashed over the priorities of peacemaking and structural adjustment, Guatemala’s state was so 
clearly too small to meet public social needs that the usually austere World Bank, IMF, and IDB 
agreed on the need to tax and spend. Unfortunately, the Arzú administration lacked the will or 
capacity to follow through on raising taxes. Faced with relatively minor opposition and a few 
demonstrations, Arzú withdrew a measure that would have begun the process of increasing state 
revenues. Thus one of the few objective, quantifiable, and verifiable government commitments in 
the peace accords went unimplemented.   
Party Formation and Political Capacity  
Whatever the differences in the specificity of the accords, or the strength of the international 
missions, the decisive difference between the two cases was the political capacity of the 
incumbent governments. Both transitional governments were based on conservative civilian 
parties with close ties to the business community. Both governments accepted the necessity of 
liberalized democratic political rules that incorporated the left. But the Salvadoran government 
showed much greater capacity to deliver on promises and commitments, while the Guatemalan 
government faltered.  
By the time Alfredo Cristiani was elected to the presidency in 1989, the ARENA party in El 
Salvador had eight years of experience in electoral competition. It had transformed itself from little 
more than a terrorist organization into a party with a broad political following, a clear and coherent 
agenda, strong electoral skills, legislative experience, and a measure of international acceptance. 
The US had played a crucial role in shaping the development of ARENA. When ARENA party 
president and reputed death squad leader Roberto D’Aubuisson was positioned to become 
provisional president of the republic following constituent assembly elections in 1982, the U.S. 
intervened to prevent his ascent. In the lead-up to presidential elections of 1984, the Reagan 
administration provided major funding to ARENA’s main opponent, the Christian Democrats. 
Meanwhile, the US invested heavily in a private-sector think tank called the Salvadoran 
Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES) whose mission was to develop a 
coherent social market program of governance, and serve as an ideological incubator for a more 
moderate, constructively neo-liberal ARENA party. Faced with US obstruction, and provided 
(indirectly) with assistance in developing a modernizing, economically neo-liberal and politically 
liberal, ARENA transformed itself in the late 1980s into a credible, business oriented party 
capable of attracting a broad base. D’Aubuisson stepped into the background, and Alfredo 
Cristiani, representing the most successful economic sectors, emerged as the dominant party 
leader and presidential candidate.  
It was on this foundation of party formation, moderation, and capacity building that ARENA was 
able to negotiate an agreement that substantially curbed the power of its erstwhile ally, the 
military, and subsequently implemented most of what the agreements required. The party’s 
internal discipline, and its strong electoral credibility, enabled it to prevail against the military as 
well as against various reactionary sectors that opposed implementation of portions of the 
accords.  
In contrast, the National Advance Party (PAN) in Guatemala was a comparatively recent party. It 
represented some of the more modernized and transnational segments of the business 
community, but faced strong competition from the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), which 
competed for votes from traditional conservative constituencies, including portions of the 
business and commercial agriculture sectors, Ladino small holders, urban middle classes, and 
indigenous communities in some rural areas. As a recent contender for power, the PAN had not 
worked out its internal differences. After winning narrowly in the 1995 elections, PAN had 
sufficient coherence and clout to negotiate the final accords with the weakened URNG, but then 
proved unable to deliver majority votes for tax increases and early approval of constitutional 
reforms. The PAN executive failed to maintain clear civilian authority with respect to the armed 
forces.  
PAN’s weakness is illustrated by its electoral defeat in 1999, which put into office Alfonso Portillo 
of the FRG. Portillo’s administration degenerated into extensive criminality and corruption, and 
made little further progress on the many unfulfilled elements of the peace accords. The FRG 
administration was so damaging to the country that deep pockets in the business community 
engaged in a new round of efforts at party building in the run up to elections in late 2003. Most of 
the money went into a new coalition known as the Great National Alliance (GANA); other funds 
went to the National Unity for Hope (UNE). GANA won the 2003 presidential elections, but failed 
to achieve a legislative majority.[24] Whether GANA will develop a sustained capacity to govern 
remains to be seen. 
Conclusions  
The early phases of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan transitions illustrate the challenges facing 
de facto governments overseeing transitions from one regime type to another. The juntas in El 
Salvador and the military governments in Guatemala had no basis in constitutional procedures 
and were patently illegitimate in the eyes of much of the public. While the Salvadoran juntas 
initially put forward a vision of socio-economic reform and moderation, this quickly wore thin and 
lost credibility as the military and intelligence services systematically murdered many of the 
ostensible beneficiaries of these reforms. Moreover, the tactical alliance between the military and 
the Christian Democrats was strained from the start. The Guatemalan governments of Ríos Montt 
and General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores had little in the way of liberalizing vision, faced 
increasing international isolation, and had no capacity to move toward sustainable governance 
without first permitting a transition to civilian rule.  
Even after partial transitions to democracy, neither of the successor civilian governments 
achieved full legitimacy, capacity to govern the national territory, or stability. The obvious role of 
the military as a parallel power at the national level—and in some cases as the only de facto 
authority at the local level—undercut legitimacy. The internal instability of the military, particularly 
in Guatemala, and its very tenuous deference to civilian authority, created a constant risk of 
coups. While the Guatemalan military’s counterinsurgency campaign was so effective as to 
prevent the URNG from seriously threatening the state in the latter stages of the conflict, the 
military was nonetheless unable to eradicate the URNG from many areas of the country. Only a 
political settlement ultimately made that possible.  
Partial democracies have obvious advantages as interim governments. Where the incumbent 
regime has a degree of domestic political legitimacy, the scope for international involvement is 
likely to be more limited.[25] They also have certain benefits that the neo-trustee variants of 
interim regimes, those governed almost exclusively by the international community, cannot 
approximate. Issues of sovereignty and international legal authority are less likely to arise; there 
is also less risk that international missions will create dependency or undercut the legitimacy of 
successor governments and institutions.  
There is a downside to such domestic legitimacy, however. Whereas internationalized interim 
governments can scale their capacity up or down in accordance with need (and the degree of 
commitment of member states), in cases where a partially democratic government is in place, the 
international community depends almost entirely on the capacity of the local state and regime. 
International missions may substitute for inadequate state capacity in limited ways or force interim 
administrations to fully comply with peace accords (as ONUSAL did in El Salvador), but the 
overall outcome of the transformation of the political system depends on local state capacity.  
The Guatemala/El Salvador comparison illustrates this clearly: the failure to implement much of 
the peace accords in Guatemala was largely attributable to shortcomings of the incumbent 
administration, as well as the weakness of the state apparatus itself. Even though international 
missions in Guatemala emphasized institution building and benefited in this regard from lessons 
learned in Nicaragua and El Salvador, they could not overcome the obstacles presented by the 
domestic political system.  
Moreover, some democratic institutions are more conducive to effective interim governance than 
others. The Guatemala case suggests that procedures requiring direct referenda to accomplish 
constitutional reform are vulnerable to manipulation, particularly in countries with high levels of 
illiteracy and political ignorance. The Guatemalan government’s difficulties in carrying out military 
reforms suggest that the pre-existing balance of power between civilian and military authorities is 
crucial as well.  
The El Salvador/Guatemala comparison suggests that interim governance is likely to be more 
effective where the parties making up the governing coalition have accumulated some years of 
political experience, or have at least achieved a measure of party discipline and coherence. The 
United States’ prolonged effort to shape and moderate ARENA paid off in an interim government 
with impressive political capacity, while the lack of such a long-term party-building experience in 
Guatemala crippled that peace process. International actors assisting a partially democratic 
interim government face real dilemmas if the local government proves to be incoherent. There will 
be little legal and political latitude for taking over deficient government functions. As a practical 
matter, international missions may be able to do little more than to sit back and watch the interim 
government stumble.  
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